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Abstract
We construct the first top income share series of a formerly socialist economy before,
during, and after socialism in order to exploit the quasi-natural experiment of the
absence of markets on incentives and income inequality. We investigate top income
shares dynamics and the sources of income at the upper tail of the income distri-
bution. Within this setup, we study the effect of capital markets and liberalized
wage settings on top income shares. Our estimates show that the introduction of
wage-setting decentralization had a role in increasing the skill premium and income
inequality in years prior the transition.
1 Introduction
What drives income inequality? Understanding what generates income disparities is
important, as it has considerable normative implications. In recent years, economists
are able to document the evolution of income inequality in long horizons that cap-
ture low-frequency events such as capital busts, the cycles of industrialization and
financial development, and the size of government. Perhaps surprisingly, however, to
date, little attention has been paid to the unique, large scale institutional experience
that lays at the heart of the economic analysis of inequality, the period of socialism.
We fill this void with a measurement study of top income shares covering the period
before, during, and after socialism.
Research compiled in Atkinson et al. (2011) highlights among the explanations
of rising top income shares the effects of tax policy shifts, labor and financial mar-
ket regulations, more lenient social norms towards earning differences, and increased
bargaining power of high earners (Piketty and Saez (2013), Piketty (2014)). An-
other strand of the literature attributes the recent surge in top income shares in
some countries to skill-biased technological change and globalisation forces favour-
ing skilled individuals that tend also to be top earners (Katz and Murphy (1992),
Acemoglu (2002), Lemieux (2006), Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Kaplan and Rauh
(2013)). In the wake of the recent global financial crisis, several studies have looked
at the effects of growth, financial development and banking crises on top income
shares (see Morelli (2012), Roine et al. (2009)). Recently, there has been much at-
tention to the role of the return on capital behind the increase in top income shares,
as was presented in Piketty (2014). The evolution of several top income series sug-
gest that institutional and market forces may have played an important role behind
these changes.
All mechanisms alluded to above operate on the distribution of income and its
dynamics through latent, market-related processes. Changes in taxation alter many
incentive structures, in particular, incentives for effort and human capital accumula-
tion. The overall effect of a tax reform in the distribution of wages and the subsequent
top income shares dynamics is a confluence of many factors. Moreover, the histor-
ical experience of high-income inequality may induce a rise in the progressivity of
taxation, or changes in institutions that are consequential to the income distribution.
As a consequence, there is a severe issue of endogeneity. Specifically, it is difficult
to identify whether latent mechanisms that are related to free markets and institu-
tions have induced both the reform and the observed subsequent dynamics of top
income shares. In order to assess these effects, economists need sophisticated models
and strong identification mechanisms. Our paper is immune to this critique.
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We assemble income data from a geographical and national boundary that evolves
from an integral part of an Empire to a mature open market economy, through a
period of socialism. We construct the first top income series of a Central-Eastern
European country to exploit the exogenous institutional setup of a socialist economy
and wage setting policy on the income distribution. Additionally, we look into how
both the incidence of socialism, as well as the post-socialist transition have shaped
the income distribution at the very top, all along the 20th century.
Our setup is tantamount to an economy with no capital markets, no population
migration, and the absence of international trade in consumption and capital goods.
Within this setup, we identify two periods. In the first period, the wage distribu-
tion is controlled by the political economy of the Communist Party. During this
period, inequality at the top remained extremely low whereas the skill premium was
decreasing, thus reflecting the distortion of incentives for effort.
The skill premium reverses its course within the period of socialism when the
Central Planning Bureau delegates wage setting to state-owned enterprises. When
the productivity signal of a worker becomes visible after wage-setting decentralisa-
tion, the skill premium increases, and inequality increases as a result. All other
latent, market-related processes remained the same as they were at the beginning of
the socialist period.
We investigate the speed and driving forces of top income shares in their con-
vergence to Western-European levels after the transition into the market economy.
The control periods are the decades before and after the communist period, when
market forces determine both capital and labour income. The treatment period of
the socialist economy provides a source of variation that is exogenous to the level of
top income shares, or any special characteristics of the country. Comparing different
time periods of one single country reduces the effect of variables other than the ones
of interest on the outcome variable, which is precisely the level of top income shares.
Obviously, these are not the only sources of variation between the control and treat-
ment periods, as the institutional setup is highly consequential. In this study we
do not look at other possible effects of socialism on top shares such as shortage of
goods, price settings and selected access to education.
During the course of the twentieth century, Hungarian top income shares follow
a U-shape as a consequence of equality by fiat rather than a secular trend in top
incomes. In the period in-between the two World Wars, top shares were as high
as in Western countries, is due from large capital structures and land. After the
Second World War, when most Western countries experienced a compression in their
top shares, the Hungarian shares decreased twice as much as a consequence of the
distributional ideology of socialism. Top income shares remained constantly low
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during the four decades of central planning. After the transition to a market economy
we observe a rapid top income share adjustment, and in less than a decade, top
income shares converge to Western levels. This increase is due to a surge both in
capital and labour income components.
With the exogenous shock, we can study the effects of market forces on the top
income shares, i.e. the effect of private ownership of capital and decentralised wage
setting mechanisms. After the transition to the market economy, the transition
from a single capital owner (the State) to multiple ones was completed, markets for
capital started to operate and investment opportunities emerged. The contribution of
capital income in the total gross income substantially increased, from which the top
of the income distribution benefitted the most. We find that in just two decades the
significance of capital income component at the very top of the distribution became
supreme, reaching comparable levels even to the USA, a country with high capital
income concentration.
Nevertheless, we find evidence that wage-setting decentralisation favouring the
remuneration of skills also played a role in the increase of the top income shares
during socialism. The comovement between the skill premium and top shares series
is apparent during the periods of market institutions. During the decades of central
planning, both series had a negative overall downward trend with a jump in 1970,
exactly when for a short reform period the strict wage settings were relaxed and
delegated to enterprises. The upward trend in the skill premium from the mid-
80’s happened parallel with the delegation of executive compensation and bonus
setting to enterprise level. This policy shift, which marked the first step to complete
liberalisation of the labour market, was followed by an increase in the top shares.
After the transition to the market economy, both series continued to surge.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section (2), we briefly summarise
the measurement instruments the and methodology we used for constructing the top
income share estimates. In Section (3), we present the top income series, and in
Section (4) we present a novel estimate of the capital share, in view of assessing
the functional distribution of income. We conclude by describing the instutional
mechanism leading to increased income disparities in Section (5).
2 Data and Measurement
As it is the case with previous research on the documentation of top income shares,
the time-frame of our analysis extends back to almost a century. In a marked dis-
tinction with the rest of the literature, our paper concerns a national boundary that
has experienced significant institutional changes and historical shocks, and whose
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comparative analysis yields the support of our reasoning. Our time-frame is brack-
eted by highly significant events such as the dissolution of Austria-Hungary under
the treaties of St. Germain and Trianon, the two World Wars, the establishment
of the People’s Republic of Hungary in 1949, and finally the transition to a market
economy. These historical shocks mark significant institutional changes and policy
orientation, by capturing the changes in economic systems that we observe over the
20th century.
We assemble primary data from official historical statistics and administrative
sources. We use the tax code and its generated income tax statistics as a measure-
ment instrument for the upper tail of the income distribution for the periods before
the Second World War, and after the transition to a market economy. We use the
available earnings censuses of the Socialized Sector from the period of the People’s
Republic of Hungary till the transition to the Republic of Hungary, a period that
we will be referring to as the socialist period. Allowing for the varying definitions
of income included in our data sources, we construct homogeneous population and
income control totals to establish comparability between periods, and we define the
top income shares accordingly.1
2.1 Definition of Income
The first comprehensive, progressive personal income tax in Hungary came into effect
while the First World War was still unfolding. The year 1915 is the first fiscal year
for which we obtain data, corresponding to income drawn in the calendar year 1914.2
We use the available income tax statistics for the period of 1914-1915 and 1927-
1940 to estimate the top income shares. For 1914-1915 the figures document total
declared income and tax levied on tax units across the sixty-four provinces of Hun-
gary, and the areas of the independent Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia along with the
port of Fiume and its suburbs, which together constitute a region that fell under the
jurisdiction of the Hungarian Kingdom at the time. For the inter-war years, the tax
statistics cover the area of Hungary after the Treaty of Trianon after World War I.
We adjust the population and income controls accordingly.
For the socialist period, we use earnings censuses reported in the Statistical Year-
books for the period 1951-1968 and published subsequently up to 1988 by the Central
Statistical Office (KSH). The frequency of the earnings statistics is irregular, with
1A detailed description of the tax system and the data sources is included in the Appendix.
2For fiscal year 1915, the tax-reporting threshold is 20,000 crows (korona). As a comparison,
the remuneration of the Prime Minister is 24,000 crowns, whereas a skilled worker earns 800 crowns
per year at that time.
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the earliest available table referring to 1951. For the period 1955-1962, the censuses
were collected yearly, while from 1962 onwards they were published biannually. The
statistics depict the distribution of gross monthly earnings, including bonuses, al-
lowances, in-kind benefits, and benefits from profit sharing. The income concept is
gross earnings before deduction of the employee social security contributions for the
entire period of 1951-1986, and for the year 1988 before the deduction of taxes levied
under the newly introduced personal income tax.
The statistics depict the share of employees in the formal sector belonging to
specific gross earning brackets based on the labour force censuses of state-owned
enterprises conducted by the State. For the period 1951-1968 earnings statistics refer
to workers employed at state-owned firms and state-owned farm establishments of the
State Sector, and at state-owned enterprises, state-owned farms, and cooperatives
in the broader Socialist sector for the rest of our time-frame. To the interest of
constructing homogeneous top income shares for the entire time frame of the socialist
economy, we explicitly assume that the distribution of earnings in the Socialist Sector
at the top coincides with the distribution of earnings at the State Sector.3
Legislation gradually introduced the present income tax code during the period
1987 to 1991. The income declared to the fiscal authority falls into two categories:
the “comprehensive” and “separately taxed” income. The comprehensive category
contains three main income subcategories: i) income from dependent activity, mainly
wages and salaries; ii) income from independent activity such as self-employment,
the exercise of liberal professions, or small-scale agricultural activities; and iii) other
income such as income earned abroad and tax-exempt income (pensions, scholarships,
and subsidies). The comprehensive income was taxed progressively during the period
1992-2008.4 The separately taxed income is a “schedular” tax on capital income
items, with different flat tax rates applied to separate categories of capital income,
such as dividends, capital gains, and profits from business activity.
We use both administrative micro data and published aggregate income tax statis-
tics for this period to estimate the top income shares. For both sources, the income
concept that we retain is gross income before deductions, and employee’s payroll and
personal income taxes, and after employers’ payroll taxes. Based on the detailed
micro data we estimate the top shares both excluding and including realised capital
3Supporting evidence for this choice is provided by statistics tables published by the Central
Statistical Office (and reproduced in the Appendix) on average earnings of employees with specific
university degrees employed either at the state or the cooperative sectors in the year of 1963 and
1967 showing similar earning amounts.
4A flat-tax was introduced in 2011. The overall statutory tax rate has been gradually decreased
from 20.32% (16% on the so-called “super-gross” tax base, i.e., the tax base inflated by 27%) to
15% since the introduction of a flat-tax.
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gains for the period of 1992-2008. The total income denominator of the later series
includes all realised capital gains.
2.2 Income Units
Tax statistics during the period before World War II report total income of an
extended family dwelling under the same living quarters. The tax base in terms
of units consists of either a single individual or a couple with dependent persons,
with the head of the family being the primary income earner.5 We approximate
the number of households as the total number of the population above the age of 15
minus the number of married women at province level reported in decennial censuses.
We adjust the data for territory change as a consequence of the treaties after World
War I. For the inter-war period, we obtain an estimate by linearly interpolating the
appropriate figures from the censuses of 1920, 1930, 1940, and 1949 covering the
Trianon borders of the country. For the socialist period and transition periods, we
estimate a population total that consists of the entire population above the age of
15 as a proxy for the potential tax base.
2.3 Income Total
To construct an income aggregate, we first assemble GDP series during the period of
study denominated in current prices, and across three different currencies (Austria-
Hungary crown, pengő, and forint). We compute personal income totals for the years
when these statistics are available. For the few years when these statistics are not
available, we proxy the total personal income by assuming it is the same fraction of
the GDP as in the neighbouring years.
For the beginning of our time frame, we use the income total series reported in
Schulze (2005), consisting of GDP estimates in the 64 provinces of the Hungarian part
of Austria-Hungary, Fiume, and the provinces of Croatia-Slavonia, in alignment with
the income reported for tax purposes. For the inter-war period we use the output
figures in Eckstein (1955) corresponding to the post World War I and Trianon treaty
territory of the country, adjusting these figures to account for market prices with
estimates of the indirect taxes found in Matolcsy and Varga (1938), and accounting
for depreciation.6 Eckstein (1955) computes net national product at factor cost. To
5Dependent individuals are considered those related to the head of the household by blood
or marriage (grandparents, children, grandchildren, in-laws), provided that they are economically
dependent on the head of the family.
6We employ a capital depreciation of 5% to obtain the gross national product figures. An
6
get an output measure in market prices, we inflate the figures by 5% based on the
estimate of indirect tax amount in the year of 1935 in Matolcsy and Varga (1938).
For the first decade of the socialist economy, the Central Statistical Office pub-
lishes income aggregates conforming to the socialist Material Product System. The
main aggregate is the Net Material Product, an accounting concept that does not
include the contribution of “unproductive” services to national income. We adjust
this series by using the average fraction of the official GDP and NMP series between
1961-1988 and apply it to the period 1950-1960. For the period of 1961-1990, we use
the official GDP data published by the Central Statistical Office under the modern
SNA definition. From 1991 up to today, we use the official Eurostat figures reported
by national authorities.
To proxy the individual income control total for the first decades of our time
frame we use a 73% contribution of our constructed GDP series as a proxy for ag-
gregate personal income.7 For the socialist period we compute a personal income
total defined as the sum of labour income, social security contributions (including
pensions, unemployment benefits, family allowances, maternity benefits, scholarship
grants, other social benefits) and the part of capital income (such as lottery, interest,
insurance) in the national income accounts data calculated by the Central Statistical
Office. For the 1991-2010 period, we use the national income data published by the
Central Statistical Office. Our constructed personal income total contains wages and
salaries, mixed income, property income including net interest, dividend, property in-
come attributed to insurance policy holders, rental income, state social contribution
(pension, sickness pay, unemployment benefits, family allowances, maternity bene-
fits), scholarships and grants. We also include the total realised capital gains amount
reported at the Tax Authorities summary tables containing items corresponding to
the actual tax code.
Concerning prices, we gather data from several published series to construct a
cost-of-living index that honours a currency unit’s worth from 1913 to today.
2.4 Parametric Form
To estimate the top income shares from raw data tables we approximate the top tail
of the income distribution by a Pareto law. We follow the methodology described in
implicit assumption in producing the estimate is that the installed capital base, albeit expanding,
was relatively modest compared to the European West. Moreover, as is documented in Tomka
(2001), the contribution of international capital flows is minimal at that time.
7We obtain this average ratio based on the total individual household income series available
only for the period of 1925-1935 and reported in Matolcsy and Varga (1936, 1938), coupled with
our compiled statistics.
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general lines in Atkinson (2007). Accordingly, the percentage of the population with
income above a given threshold yi distributed across i = 1; : : : ; n brackets is given
by the hazard function
H(yi) = 1  F (yi) =

c
yi

; i = 1; : : : ; n
where  is the Pareto shape parameter, and c is the scale parameter. Assuming
constancy of the shape parameter in between two neighbouring brackets i; i+1 from
a total of n brackets, and linearising the hazard function yields
 = log(pi/pi+1)/ log (si+1/si) ; i = 1; : : : ; n
where si is the income threshold of the bracket i and pi is the cumulative share of
people with income above this threshold. Then
c = sip
1/
i ; i = 1; : : : ; n
Finally, given the values of the parameters (; c), we produce the exact income
threshold and income shares for any top income quantile.
3 Top Income Shares
This section analyses the evolution of the Hungarian top income shares for the period
between 1914 and 2008, projected in a historical and institutional context. We depict
homogeneous series of economic performance and prices for the entire 20th century
in Figure (1).8 An overview of real GDP per capita index reveals that the country
has witnessed high growth rates after 1945 compared to the inter-war period, and a
profound crisis during the transition from socialism, along with a surge in the average
level of prices.
During the entire 20th century, inequality has followed a U-shape, as is witnessed
in Figure (2). The measurement methodology of Gini coefficients renders the esti-
mates incomparable across periods. The revealed pattern exhibits an increase in
inequality during the Great Depression years, a much lower difference during so-
cialism, and a surge in Gini series after the transition out of socialism. Jumps in
inequality occur in historical events such as the Great Depression and the financial
8Tomka (2010) compares per capita GDP indices in 13 Western European countries and finds
that Hungary lays in a distance of around 60% of the Western European frontier in the period
1914-1940.
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crises of 1929/31, the establishment of the socialist economic model, a few years
following the reforms of the New Economic Mechanism of 1968, as well as the transi-
tion to a free market economy. Income inequality is markedly higher in periods with
private property and open markets in comparison with the socialist period. Our top
income shares estimates are in line with this pattern.
3.1 From Austria-Hungary to World War II, 1914-1940
An established fact in the late 19th century economic historiography of the Hapsburg
Empire is that the patterns of economic growth were chequered, ranging across the
eastern and western constituencies of the Empire. The Hungarian Kingdom on the
wake of the 20th century is still, by and large, an agrarian economy with significant
historical impediments in industrialisation as nearly half of its production is drawn
from the primary sector. Schulze (2000), in discussing new estimates of output in
the various regions of the empire provides evidence to support the Komlos (1983)
argument of a capital inflow in the Hungarian Kingdom after the Vienna stock-
market panic of 1873, fostering the first wave of industrialization in a largely agrarian
economy.9
The aftermath of the Armistice was highly consequential for both parts of the
Empire. Growth slowed down after the war and its ensuing capital bust, as the
Hungarian state was confined to one-third of its Imperial-era frontiers, leaving outside
a sizeable part of its endowment in both labour and natural resources and disrupting
trade routes. The treaties of Trianon and St. German-en-Laye deprived Hungary
of more than approximately 70% of the former territories of the Hungarian Crown.
There was a prolonged contraction of aggregate activity, reflecting the misallocation
of resources due to the war effort.
The financial crisis of 1929-1931 and the hyperinflation that erupted after World
War I slowed down economic development as it wiped out what was left of the
banking industry. A stabilisation program conducted by the League of Nations was
successful in setting the economy back on track. In the years leading to World War
II, the fallback was reversed by strong recovery years resulting in similar growth
patterns than in the developed European countries. This process was again halted
by a destruction of the capital base during World War II.
9New and reliable estimates of the share of the primary sector outlay over total value added in
late 19th century Hungary bring it to around 50% over the period 1870-1913. See Schulze (2000),
Table. A2 for estimates using a value-added approach, and Schulze (2007) on regional disparities
between Austria and Hungary. See Berend and Ránki (1974), Ránki (1964), for a discussion of main
impediments to the industrialisation process, from the perspective of socialist-era historiography.
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We estimate top income shares over the period 1914-1941. Late industrialisation
and heavy reliance on the primary sector results in a skewed income distribution with
three distinct societal groups, as highlighted by Éltető and Láng (1971) and Berend
and Ránki (1974). The bottom 80 percent is comprised of servants, agricultural, and
factory workers with below-average income, while the less than 20 percent middle
class includes mainly privately employed administrative employees, civil servants,
engineers, doctors, teachers with much higher than average income. The top of the
income distribution consists of landowners, high-income earners such as wholesale
merchants and bankers, and capital owners with sometimes 20-40 times higher than
average income.
The skewed distribution of landownership of the historically numerous Hungar-
ian nobility and large landholders had been a political predicament ever since the
Revolution of 1848. Eddie et al. (1993) document a declining share of land in the
hands of large holders between 1893 and 1935, with land becoming a productive as-
set whose property rights were increasingly traded held by financial intermediaries.10
An early inequality study by Matolcsy (1938) depicts a Lorenz curve similar to that
of Germany and the United States during the 1930s.
The overall evolution of the top income shares is depicted in Figure (3). At the
beginning of the first part of the 20th century, the top 1% is estimated to hold than
15% of income, while the top 0.1% in some years even reached 7.5%, which are in line
with top share estimates at the Western countries that time. The top shares display
an overall decreasing trend during this period, at a time where Hungary underwent
the First World War, a hyperinflation, the Great Depression and a banking crisis.
In 1927, our estimates exhibit similar levels to the pre-war shares. During the inter-
war period, the Hungarian economy was distressed by the Great Depression. The
situation worsened when it was also hit by the banking and credit crises starting in the
summer of 1931 with the insolvency of the Viennese Credit-Anstalt that propagated
into Hungary.11
Historical accounts of banking crises show that they are followed by capital busts,
liquidity shortage, recessions and high unemployment rates. Capital busts have been
reported to affect the top shares more severely, especially in times when agents at the
10Growth in the late 19th century was led by increases in productivity in agriculture in which the
eastern part of the Empire exhibited a comparative advantage. Capital flows increased after the
Vienna panic of 1873 were directed to the primary sector, with a few notable exceptions in material
processing industries and textiles. Land ownership retained its historically skewed pattern, with
0.16% of the greatest proprietors of Hungarian land owning 33% of total farming area in 1910; see
Ránki (1964).
11See Schubert (1991) for an account of this incident, and Berend and Ránki (1974), pp. 111-113,
Fior (2008), pp. 109,138 for its consequences in Hungary.
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very top are capital owners and have access to the stock market, whereas the latter
affect the bottom of the distribution; see Morelli (2012). In Figure (6) we document
the co-movement of the top income shares with the Budapest stock market index.
The change in the top shares depends on the relative decline in the different parts of
the distribution. Bordo and Meissner (2011) find that in most countries during the
interwar period the top of the income distribution was hit more severely leading to
contracting top shares. Our estimates show the same trend with a 17 and 33 percent
decrease in the 1% and 0.1% shares between 1927 and 1934, respectively.
The income decomposition of the top shares is shown in Figure 4 for the years
when income source figures are reported in the official statistics. The series shows
that during the first decades of the last century more than half of the originated from
capital holdings for income earners at the top 0.1%. The Figure displays that both
capital and business income were hit severely in the crises period as they contracted
by the beginning of 1930’s compared to 1915.12 Employment income became a
significant part of the top shares, with a three- to four-fold increase in less than
two decades, suggesting structural changes at the top of the income distribution.
Similarly to the western parts of Europe, the Hungarian top shares started to recover
only after the mid-1930’s. The source of recovery in the top shares was due to an
increase in the business income as depicted in Figure (4). This surge coincides
with the recovery of the economy driven by some specific industrial sectors such
as electrical production, and tradeables such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals.13
Overall, income from large capital structures, either businesses or land, dominates
the composition of the top income shares in the interwar period.
3.2 Socialist Economy, 1951-1988
Central Planning and Partial Reforms Concurrently with the Western Eu-
ropean reconstruction, albeit in an entirely different institutional setting, the Hun-
garian economy rapidly converts into a command economy between 1949 and 1953.
Instruments of this transformation were the nationalisation of the industrial base,
the forced collectivisation of agriculture, and the shut-down of capital markets. The
exogenously imposed Soviet model relied on the promotion of heavy industry, and
12Berend and Ránki (1974), pp. 147-148 documents some aspects of this capital flight: 4500
million pengő bank deposits before World War I in savings banks reduced to 752 million pengő in
the aftermath of the financial crisis.
13Mass production was not yet prevalent, and against the background of a deferred industrial
development, Hungary was lagging behind most European countries. Slowly, though, the dominance
of the agricultural and food industry started to fade away; Berend and Ránki (1974), pp. 116, 122,
134-144, 167.
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the concentration of productive assets to the direct control of the central government.
Private production of capital goods was abolished, investment was the responsibility
of the central government, and secondary financial markets closed.
The State delegated corporate governance to the top management of State-owned
companies. The central government controlled all property rights to all productive
assets and was the ultimate beneficiary of any operating surplus.14 Firms had no
autonomy, quantities were centrally planned in every detail, and prices were set
centrally without reflecting market demand and supply. With fixed final prices and
artificially low raw input prices, managers were not given the incentive to realise
higher profits through lower production cost or more efficient production, as they
received their bonuses if the planned production targets were fulfilled at any cost.
Realised production fell short of targets in every consecutive five-year plan. This
incentive mechanism led to low investment in R&D, lower quality of final goods,
overproduction of some specific stocks, and shortage of other goods.15
Due to the visible defaults and the manifested discontent with the system during
the Revolution of 1956, the planners initiate a series of partial reforms during the
1950s and 1960s.16 These reforms aimed at introducing efficiency considerations,
without breaking from the central planning paradigm. The planners tried to achieve
higher efficiency by allowing more autonomy to enterprises, and by reducing the
number of centrally given commands. Nevertheless, these partial reforms did not go
all the way in introducing real markets.
Some important changes concerned wage setting. In particular, instead of de-
termining wages via the compulsory payroll figures that were decided at the central
planning bureau level, wage setting was based on “average wage” instructions for var-
ious occupational categories. During the partial reforms, enterprises received more
freedom to set the allocation of bonuses, although they were given serious disincen-
tives not to do so.17
The effect of the first wave of partial reforms on the top income shares amounts
to a 12% increase in 1957 compared to 1955 as portrayed in Figure (7).18 Survey
14See Portes (1969) for a description of the production sector at the time.
15Weitzman (1976, 1980) highlights the prevalent “ratchet effect” of this contractual arrangement
between the central planning authorities and state-owned enterprises. The result was persistent
under-performance, for fear of setting elevated future performance targets.
16See Berend (1990) for a detailed account of a series of partial, and lesser known reform attempts.
17See Berend (1990), and Kornai (1980), Ch. 16. for a detailed exposition of the socialist wage
setting system.
18The increase in the 1956 top shares is due to the drastic jump in the income denominator in
the year of the Revolution of 1956. The increase, however, of the 1957 shares cannot be attributed
to a change in the denominator as nominal per capita GDP reversed back to its trend level.
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evidence suggests that the top of the income distribution is occupied by the manage-
ment of state-owned enterprises and white-collar workers. The earnings differentials
between the top of the employment ladder and blue-collar workers were primar-
ily created by allowances and similar benefits. These income items are included in
our income statistics. The result of these partial reforms was, however, reversed as
witnessed in the Income Survey of 1962. Skilled workers and enterprise managers
observed an increase of 7% and 5% in household income between 1959 and 1962,
whereas households on the bottom of the skill ladder increased by more than 10%.19
The New Economic Mechanism (NEM) of 1968 was a response to persistent
sluggishness. The system evolved from a centrally planned model of development to
one in which every element of the balance sheets of households and firms was either
taxed or subsidised. Property rights to productive capital and corporate governance
were retained by the central government. Little, if anything, was left to be determined
by an unfettered market on which prices are set freely.
After 1968, and instead of explicit commands on the resources to be used and
production targets, the central government tried to provide further profit incentives
in view of meeting the objectives of the periodic five-year plans. Although more
freedom was allowed in wage setting, the average salary was still centrally deter-
mined with upper and lower payment limits for specific occupations. Additionally,
if the enterprise wage bill surges were above a certain level, then heavy taxation was
imposed. As part of the NEM reforms, the surplus of state-owned enterprises was
not taxed away entirely by the central government, but it was channelled back into
“profit sharing” funds to be redistributed among the managers and employees. The
maximum profit-share dividend was set at 15%, 50%, 80% percent of the remuner-
ations for workers, middle-level management, and top management, respectively.20
Figures 3 and 7 respectively depict an 11-26 percentage increase in the very top
shares, and a 5-7 percentage increase at the lower shares between 1966 and 1970
exactly after the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism.
A mixed-price setting mechanism replaced the overall direct price determination
by authorities. This process included the so-called “free” prices set by enterprises,
though controlled by the state via a set of regulations. These price control instru-
ments included profit-margin restrictions, temporary “price stops”, laws concerning
“unfair prices”, instructions and direct price rules virtually everywhere in the pro-
19We cannot compute percentiles from our income threshold estimates, as these thresholds refer
to individual income. We do observe however that a single earner household who is a CEO of
a state-owned enterprise in 1962 takes home 3,371 forints, an amount that puts the head of the
household at the top 0.5% of the income distribution, according to our estimates.
20See Berend (1990), pp. 170-179 for an outline of this mechanism.
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duction process.
As a result of heavy regulation, relative prices of final goods were distorted, and
the shortage of goods was a widespread phenomenon (Kornai (1979, 1980)). Shortage
of commodities affected the diverse segments of the society unevenly. The situation
was further distorted by capital controls, manifested in foreign exchange quotas for
only parts of the population.
Our data depict an image of the effect of these distortions on the income dis-
tribution, by comparing the top shares during socialism to those during the market
economy decades before and after. In addition to the significant difference in the
level of top shares immediately after the beginning of the new economic regime, there
is an overall decreasing trend afterwards. The sharp jump in 1970 is due to a new
set of partial reforms aiming at increasing wage differentials of enterprise managers
particularly via sharp differences in bonus payments, to provide incentives resulting
in higher productivity. The increasing trend from the mid-1980’s also occurred after
managerial wage and bonus setting were delegated to enterprise councils.21
The regulation of the price of labour was a central component of socialism, set
by the State monopsony of labour. Different wage tables existed for blue and white-
collar employees that prescribed earnings differentials between blue collar and white
collar workers, administrative workers, and managerial staff. However for short re-
form periods the strict wage settings were relaxed and delegated to enterprises to
increase production efficiency.22 We exploit this variation in our argument below.
Capital Income During socialism, households had limited capacity to own real
or financial assets, property rights were not secure, and investment opportunities
in sectors other than the government were heavily regulated. The degree of this
institutional setting was absolute, even though a shadow economy was operational.23
The monetary authority was entirely subject to the periodic plans, in effect rel-
egating the money creation privilege to the central planners. High-powered money
was financing the investments and operational capital of state-owned enterprises,
and the needs of the wage bill. Loans and mortgages were issued by the National
Savings Bank and the Saving Cooperatives (Takarékszövetkezet), two financial insti-
tutions subject to the monetary authority. All interest rates were centrally regulated.
A practically unchanged nominal interest rate with suppressed inflation resulted in
21See Cukor (1990), p. 9 and Héthy (1990).
22Among others, see Boote and Somogyi (1991), p. 18, and Éltető and Láng (1971), pp. 303-314.
23In all socialist countries, an informal sector was operational in varying degrees; see Grossman
(1977) for an outline. Productive assets, however, were not traded in the informal sector, and
capital gains were outlawed.
14
negative real interest rates for several years.
Owner-occupied housing was the most important real asset. However, neither
rental income nor capital gains on these real assets was part of household income.
In particular, during the entire socialist period, households retained limited and
non-transferable occupancy rights to residences. The rental and secondary property
markets were non-existent. Quotas to ownership and limited transferability of the
property rights to houses made it impossible for such a secondary market to develop.
As a result, household portfolios were elementary, containing mainly cash deposits
and savings.24 Property rights to bank deposits were not secure.
Any capital income will have to be imputed based on assumptions whose validity
is impossible to verify. Nevertheless, we provide an upper bound estimate of possible
capital income in Figure (9). We do so by imputing an upper limit on capital income
based on the distribution of capital income to the top percentiles in 1992, on the wake
of the opening up of secondary financial markets after the transition. Capital income
was negligible among the top 1% compared to the era before and after socialism.
3.3 Transition to Free Markets, 1992-2008
Post-transition, Hungary enters a rapid process of liberalising the labour market,
distributing property rights to capital through privatisation, and opening up markets
in productive assets and final goods. A vast assemblage of a vintage capital stock
was privatised. This process started in Hungary earlier and was completed more
rapidly than the rest of the countries of Eastern Europe. In 1992, one-third of the
firms were privately owned.25
The shock during the years of the transition into the market economy resulted in
a drastic decrease in per capita output. In recent years including the financial crises
years the average growth rate was of 1.8% (1992-2010).
A property restitution program was also implemented, giving back property
rights on real assets that were expropriated since 1939 including the inter-war,
pre-communist and communist regimes to the original owners or their descendants.
The process was completed by giving partial compensation paid in freely tradeable
coupons that could be used to bid in auctions for state property; Bornstein (1997),
pp. 325-326.
Markets for capital started to operate, and investment opportunities emerged.
Income shares of both capital and labour increased in tandem. Immediately after
24See Portes and Winter (1978), and Ábel and Székely (1992).
25The mode of privatisation evolved from management buyouts to an orderly, regulated process
via competitive tenders; see Brown et al. (2006), p. 71.
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the transition the top 0.1% share tripled and the top 1% doubled, while the next
percentiles increased less markedly (P95-99 by 65%, P90-95 by 50%). The top 1%
share increased much faster than the following percentiles: in 2008 the top 1% shares
were still below the level seen in 1940, while the income share of the next four
percentile surpassed it.
There is an apparent increasing trend in the recent top income shares as dis-
played in Figure (3) and Figure (7). A peak in top shares in 1999 is followed by
some stagnation years and increase again from 2005 onwards. To be able to detect
the driving forces behind the movement of the top income shares, we estimated the
decomposition of the top shares displayed in Figure (8). Capital income shares fol-
lowed clearly the market movements with significant drops in realised financial gains
during 1997-1998 and 2002, when Hungary was severely hit by the financial crises
originating from the Asian stock market, and by global equity market downturn.
There is an increased share of realised real asset gains since the mid-90’s with a drop
in 2007, following the real estate boom and bust of the housing bubble, associated
with decreased foreign investment in the property market. It is also apparent from
our estimates that there was a significant drop in business income shares after 2002
as a result of drop in business activities among the top income recipients.26
3.4 External Validity
How far did Socialism manage to compress the income distribution compared to other
countries? And how quickly the shares adjusted after the transition into the market
economy? We address these questions by comparing the Hungarian top 1% shares
to those of other countries in Figure (10) below. Inter-war Hungarian top income
shares were as high as the shares of the Western European core. Hungary converted
to a Soviet satellite at a time when Europe is undergoing a massive reconstruction
stage, with high public investment and the conception of the modern European
welfare state. Top income shares estimates of Nordic countries cluster well above
what Hungary exhibits after World War II when most of the countries experience a
compression of top income shares: socialism brought a compression of top income
inequality twice as much, and continued to keep low during the next four decades.
It is also apparent that immediately after the transition to the market economy, the
Hungarian top income shares rapidly adjusted, and continued to increase.
Comparisons with China and India offer external validity in our estimates. In
26The drop in business income is unlikely to be due to simple reorganization of tax labels as only
one main item was excluded from business income after 1995, but the decrease started many years
later in 2001.
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particular, China exhibits almost identical top income inequality at the beginning of
the Deng Xiaoping reforms in the early 80s, albeit with dissimilar trends.27
4 The Capital Share
Which segment of the income distribution benefited the most during the socialist
period? After the transition the significance of capital component including realised
capital gains at the very top of the income distribution quickly recovered in Hungary,
rapidly approaching levels of the inter-war period. Those at the top 1% and top 0.1%
received respectively more than 25% and 50% of their income from capital income
during the years preceding the recent financial crises. Meanwhile, the lower fractiles
received much smaller shares of their income from capital. In just two decades the
significance of capital income component at the very top of the distribution became
important, reaching comparable levels even to the USA, a country with high capital
income concentration.28
The factor decomposition of earners at the top 1% is displayed in Figure (5). It is
clear from the income decomposition that the capital income component was a strong
drive behind the surge in the top income shares after the transition to the market
economy. During the inter-war period, top income shares are high, and they come
from large capital structures and land, in agreement with the rest of the Western
European experience at that time. During socialism, the top income shares are solely
composed of labour income since profits accrue to the State. After the transition,
income shares of both capital and labour increase in tandem, as secondary capital
markets open up and labour services are traded in a decentralised economy.
Bengtsson and Waldenström (2015) are concerned with the relationship between
capital shares and personal income inequality. Our finding is in line with the state-
ment that both capital and labour income factors play a significant role in increasing
income inequality when market forces determine endowment valuations. In particu-
lar, we depict a situation where market forces are of the first-order, and where the
adjustment witnessed after the transition is due to the opening up of markets for
factor services. Figure (12) displays that the capital share of GDP rapidly reached
27Alvaredo et al. (2013) highlight two trends in the long run top income shares; the English
speaking countries following a U-shape, and the continental European countries and Japan display-
ing an L-shape. The recent Hungarian top income shares show an increasing trend similar to the
U-shaped countries, but the level of the shares is akin to the L-shaped countries.
28The capital income component including realised gains for the top 1% and 0.1% shares in
Hungary was 32.99% and 52.83% in 2006, respectively, while it amounted to 30.1% and 37.2% in
the USA in that year (calculations based on Piketty and Saez (2006)).
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a remarkably constant level, also illustrating that the remuneration proportion of
capital in the total gross income increased substantially.
What, if anything, can the evidence compiled here say about the classical political
economy problem of factor share distribution? After the transition to a market
economy, self-employment and entrepreneurship started to play a role.29 The share
level adjusts during the six years of transition, increasing from the level on which it
is clustered during the years we have data on socialism, and staying on a remarkably
stable level after that.
Piketty (2014) argues that regulations on the remuneration of capital have damp-
ened the increase in the capital share after World War II in market economies. We
indeed find that this is true, in an extreme case where these regulations are far more
consequential, namely the shut-down of secondary capital markets and the delegation
of the investment decision to the state. Eichengreen (1994) highlights the effects of
labour market institutions on the functional distribution, and in particular the de-
gree of unionisation and the bargaining power of unions. Karabarbounis and Neiman
(2014) attribute labour share movements to shocks that influence the rental rate of
capital. The decline in the relative price of investment goods, often attributed to
advances in technology, will substitute labour for capital and therefore increase its
relative part on total income. In our case, the opening up of the economy to domestic
and international markets was an indisputable factor in driving factor shares.
After the transition to a market economy, changes in fixed capital formation have
been remarkable. An assemblage of vintage capital structures was privatised. On
the wake of the recent financial crisis, the country was a net debtor in foreign direct
investment of about 62% of GDP in 2009.30 The transition from state-owned to
privately owned capital also marked the transition from a single owner to multiple
ones, the domestic and international secondary capital markets, as well as to global
finance.
29Gollin (2002) highlights the measurement issues that arise in countries where self-employment
is significant. Our estimates of the capital share assume a ratio of labour and capital income in
the mixed-income as that in the whole national income excluding mixed income. Details on the
measurement methodology are in the Appendix.
30Updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2007).
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5 Institutions and Incentives
5.1 Incentives
Decisions on human capital accumulation and incentives for effort are determined
by the dynamics of the wage distribution. In turn, the dynamics of the wage dis-
tribution is affected by labor market imperfections, notably the technology and the
market structure in the production side, conditions that induce the observed wage
distribution as an outcome. These aggregate imperfections are compounded with the
imperfections in capital markets, and in particular those that affect credit and bor-
rowing constraints. When factor and product markets are perfect, and abstracting
from issues of agency and imperfect information, the wage distribution will reflect
differences in marginal productivity, and hence the exercise of effort in human capital
investment and training.
Earned income is a major part of our top income share estimates during the
periods of free markets, and the essential part of the estimates during the socialist
period. Hamermesh and Portes (1972) refer to the market structure on the side
of supply as being ”close to the textbook level case”, notably the “trade unions’
insignificant effect on wages.” (p. 241). With an unfettered labor supply side, and
given the centralized structure of production in a socialist economy, the wage and
hence the income distribution were, by and large, set by the state monopsony of
labor. In order to investigate the extent to which the institutional arrangement of
socialism has affected incentives for effort, we estimate the relative price of skills over
the entire period of our top income shares estimates, from the 1920s to 2008.
To the interest of compiling homogeneous estimates across periods, we define the
skill premium according to the availability of aggregate labor market statistics. We
construct the ratio of the average wage of white collar workers over the average wage
of blue collar workers. The dynamics of the skill premium closely track those of the
earned income part of our top income shares estimates, as is shown in Figure (14).
Both series have a negative overall downward trend during the most of the socialist
period. The skill premium series displays an upward trend from the early 1980’s that
is followed by an increase in the top shares. Both series continue to increase around
this trend after the transition to the market economy.
In our setup, the swings in top income shares during socialism reflect wage dif-
ferentials between skilled and unskilled workers, as a result of a series of gradual,
productivity-linked remuneration reforms. Changes in these differentials were ob-
tained as a result of a non-transparent, political bargaining process within the Com-
munist Party apparatus.
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The introduction of partial reforms during socialism coincides with jumps in the
skill premium and top labor income shares. According to Berend (1990), the New
Economic Mechanism of 1968 introduced meritocratic elements that favoured those
with skills and expertise, while it attacked the vested interests of the rank-and-file
Communist Party members at the state or managerial apparatus, whose power was
in jeopardy. Those against such productivity-linked wage reforms and profit-sharing
schemes put forward arguments such as the defence of the “values of socialism” and
considerations of the “workers’ interest.” Blue-collar workers were also against the
reform as they claimed it shifted the income distribution unfavourably for them,
essentially resisting to an increase in wage dispersion. Since blue-collar workers
were the majority of the labour force, and with a political system dependent on the
subsistence of the labour base, the earnings difference of skilled and unskilled workers
were heavily bargained in the internal political process of the Party. The results of
partial reforms in the skill premium and the income shares dynamics were short-lived
at every introduction, as raises of wages at the bottom outperformed those at the
top. This political process persisted up until the end of the 1970s. The persistent
decrease in the skill premium over this period seems is directly linked to the decrease
in the top share after the jump in 1970.31
As part of the New Economic Mechanism the Central Planning Bureau gave the
right to state-owned enterprises to exploit some margins of compensation to workers
according to productivity, essentially redistributing a fraction of any potential surplus
to the middle and top management. Though this wage reform was short-lived, we
see a parallel increase both at the skill premium and at the top shares exactly after
the introduction of the reform in 1968. The reform was reversed almost immediately,
followed by decreasing skill premium and top income shares.
The process of a gradual decrease in the skill premium is reversed in the end of
the 1970s. During that time a significant reform took place, with wage and bonus
settings of executives were delegated to enterprise level. This policy shift, that
marks a first step to complete liberalisation of the labour market, led to a reversal
of the decrease of the relative price of skills. The increase in the top shares from
the mid-80’s coincides with this delegation of wages and bonuses to the enterprise
level.32 This remuneration scheme favoured skilled workers over unskilled ones, as
the productivity signal was more accurately observed on the enterprise level.
After the transition, evidence of skill-biased technical change is prevalent, al-
though interrupted by labour market regulations and foreign exchange crises during
the mid-2000s. Our findings are in line with Kézdi (2002) who documents a steady in-
31Berend (1990), p. 202, Mieczkowski (1975), pp. 222-223, Flakierski (1986), pp. 54-55 Table 4.
32Köllő (2001) gives a rough outline of this reform.
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crease in the skill premium for the years 1986-1995 as a consequence of inter-sectoral
skill reallocation. Kézdi (2002) documents job loss for unskilled labor, proxied by
years of schooling, and an even higher skill premium growth for the second half of
the ’90s with skill biased technological change at most sectors. Moreover, Brown
et al. (2006) provide evidence of increased productivity differentials of labour op-
erating in foreign-managed companies over those that are domestically held after
privatizations.
5.2 Institutions
Political institutions that affect redistributive policies are endogenous to inequality.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2015) summarise this approach, according to which the
technology evolves endogenously as a result of economic and political institutions.
Institutions, in turn, shape the technology and the labour market, on which the
relative price of skills and the supply of skilled labour is formed. These labour
market conditions are of relevance to the subsequent evolution of top income shares.
To illustrate this mechanism, Acemoglu and Robinson (2015) use as a case study
the ratio of white to black wages compiled by Leibbrandt et al. (2010) during the
20th century in South Africa, which is a de facto proxy for the skill premium. They
argue that the disconnect between an increasing skill premium and the rapid fall
of inequality at the top in South Africa is explained by the non-market institution
of apartheid, itself a result of a political process relating to the level of resource
endowments and its distribution in the beginning of the 20th century. In the context
of our study, this would have meant that the documented high inequality in the
interwar years, stemming from a skewed distribution of capital income that favors
the top percentiles, would have brought about the non-market institutional setup of
socialism and its extreme capital taxation and redistributional policies.
Our paper is immune to this critique. The planned economy period we investigate
is a quasi-experiment of a non-market institution that is exogenously imposed and
sustained. Socialism did not arise as a result of a political bargaining process that is
endogenous, that is, as a result of a heightened income inequality during the inter-war
period.
Indeed, in post WorldWar II Hungary, large parts of the population and especially
small landholders, were represented by the centre-left Smallholders Party (Független
Kisgazdapárt) that won 57% of the vote in the elections of 1945, against the 17%
of the Communist Party that had a stalinist disposition. The democratic forces
were gradually removed from office after a series of coups that came to be known as
“salami tactics.” From then on, de facto political power was held by the Communist
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Party. The Party was more of a Soviet-backed puppet organisation rather than a
“grassroots” movement originating in the revolutionary movements of the inter-war
period.
After World War I, the short-lived bolshevic revolution of Béla Kun was held
responsible for exacerbating hyperinflation forces that ensued as a result of seignorage
of the war expenses (Sargent (1982)). Berend and Tibor (2005) argue that the left-
leaning forces were nascent during the interwar period, which may have fostered a
certain kind of retaliatory disposition after the end of World War II. However, the
electoral outcome of 1945 for the Communist Party precludes the possibility of such
political and ideological path-dependence. While the October Revolution may have
been the result, among others, of an extreme form of deprivation of the majority of the
population in Tsarist Russia, socialism in Hungary was exogenously and forcefully
constructed rather than inspired. Therefore, socialist redistributive policies that
affected the income distribution dynamics were exogenous to prior conditions on
inequality.
In free markets, fiscal instruments operate on the distribution of final outcomes
and subsequent top income share dynamics through multiple, market-related latent
channels. The effect of a tax on capital (structures or equipment) will affect the
labour market and the wage distribution in ways that operate through production
elasticities, aggregate investment, as well as the effective supply of labour. In an
incomplete markets setup, and apart from preference heterogeneity, the effects will
depend on the distribution of assets, skills, and the opportunities offered by the
market. It is difficult to obtain clear results that will yield transparent economic
mechanisms, or even identification of the channels on which a certain tax reform
operates to the final income distribution.
An interpretation of the socialist experience in Hungary from 1949 to 1991 is one
that is tantamount to the confiscation of private capital, an effective tax on capital of
close to 100%. The fusion of the party and the government resulted in expropriating
the entire productive capital stock. Corporate governance of state-owned enterprises
was entirely under the direct control of the Party establishment, who operated the
state apparatus. Decisions on prices and quantities reflected the political economy of
socialism, rather than the workings of a free or regulated market. Moreover, the state
operated as a monopsony of labour, and entrepreneurship was abolished. Secondary
capital and goods markets were non-existent. All of the latent mechanisms alluded
to above were shut-down, by an institutional setting that was exogenously imposed.
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6 Conclusion
In this study, we used individual tax statistics to construct top income share series for
the periods prior the Second World War, and after the transition to a market econ-
omy. We complemented the series with available earning censuses in the socialised
sector for the planned economy period.
We have exploited the quasi-natural experiment of partial liberalization of wage
setting during the socialist era to study questions such as the effects of market forces
on the top income shares; how both the incidence of socialism, as well as the post-
socialist transition have shaped the income distribution at the very top; and how
quickly the shares returned to Western-European levels after the transition into the
market economy.
During the studied period between 1914 and 2008 the Hungarian top income share
series followed a U-shape. The top shares were as high as in Western countries (USA,
UK, France) and came from large capital structures and land during the first decades
of our time frame. After the Second World War, when most Western countries
experienced a compression in their top shares, the Hungarian shares decreased twice
as much and remained constantly low during the four decades of socialism. After the
transition to a market economy we observed a rapid top income share adjustment:
in less than a decade top income shares increased to levels prevalent in western
countries, and the increase was due to a surge both in capital and labour income
factors.
The constructed top share estimate series suggest that both capital income via
the allocation of capital holdings from the state to private owners and securing
property rights; and labour income via wage-setting decentralization favoring the
remuneration of skills played a significant role at increasing income inequality during
market economies. Investigating whether institutions that promote market efficiency
have a more profound effect than secular movements of top income shares can be
more fruitful in understanding income disparities.
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Figure 1: (a) Real GDP per Capita Index (2011=100); Trendlines refer to periods 1946-1989 and 1993-2011.
(b) CPI index (2011=100). Methodology and historical data sources are provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 2: Gini coefficients, 1930-2010
Source:1928-1941: Földvári (2009) computes Gini estimates based on official income tax statistics, and by
assuming Pareto distribution. 1951-1988: Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) calculates Gini coefficents based
on per capita household income (HH), and employee earnings both at the state and socialist sectors. 1987-
2009: OECD publishes per capita Gini series based on the Tárki Household Monitor survey. 1987-2007:
World Bank publishes Gini series based on the household surveys of the Hungarian Statistical Office. The
unit of analyses is all workers at the state or socialist sectors for the series based on the employee earning
censuses, and per capita household income for all other series.
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Figure 3: Percentage of total income received by each of the top groups on the income distribution, 1914-2008.
Notes: Income is defined before taxes; capital gains are excluded in years 1914-1940 and included in years
1992-2008. For the period 1951-1988, income is defined as wages and salaries of state-owned enterprises.
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Figure 4: Decomposition of the top 0.1% income share, 1914-2008
Notes: Capital is defined as income from capital assets, land and buildings. For the period 1992-2008 realized
capital gains are included. Labor income is defined as wages and salaries and other employment income.
Business income is mixed income. In 1914 the decomposition of top 0.1 income share is assumed to be the
same as the decomposition of top 0.14, and in 1915 as the top 0.2 (see Appendix 2.2). See the Appendix for
a comprehensive definition of income.
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Figure 5: Income source decomposition of the top 1% income share, 1932-2008
Notes: Capital income is defined as income from financial assets (interest, dividends),
land and buildings and for 1992-2008 including capital gains. Labor income includes
wages and salaries and other employment income. Business income is mixed income.
See the Appendix for the precise definition of income.
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Figure 6: Quarterly market index of the Budapest stock exchange, 1927-1945, and
top 1 and 0.1 percent income shares, 1914-1940. (Source: own computations, League
of Nations Statistical Yearbook (various issues)).
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Figure 7: Top 1, 5 and 10 percent income shares in Hungary, 1914-2008
Note: Percentage of total income received by each of the top groups. Income is
defined before taxes and excludes capital gains for 1914-1940, and includes capital
gains for 1992-2008. For 1951-1988 income is based on earning tables. For 1914-1988
the fractiles are defined by total income excluding realized capital gains, and for
1992-2008 including realized capital gains also. (For details see Appendix section 2,
3 and 6.)
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Figure 8: Decomposition of the top 0.1 percent income share, 1992-2008
Note: Income decomposition of total income received by the top 0.1 percent. Labor:
wages and salaries, bonus, in kind benefit, stock option, and employee stock, tax-
able cost compensations, pension, unemployment and maternity benefit, scholarship.
Business labor: self-employed and partnership income, liberal profession, agricultural
income. Dividend: general dividends, and dividends received through partnership.
Real asset capital gain: realized gain from selling property, movable goods, rights.
Financial capital gain: realized gain from selling financial assets. Other capital: any
other taxable capital income such as rent, annuities and interest not taxed at the
source. See Table 12 for detailed income categories.
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Figure 9: Imputed upper bound on capital income, 1951-1992.
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Figure 10: Top 1% income shares, 1925-2008.
Note: For Hungary the shares are reported with and without realized capital gains for 1992-2008. Source:
World Top Incomes Database and our computations.
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Figure 11: Top 0.1% income share and top marginal income tax rate, 1914-2008.
Notes: See the Appendix for construction of the top marginal tax rates. The top 1%
income share series for 1927-1940 excludes capital gains, for 1992-2008 it includes
capital gains, and for 1951-1988 it is based on earning tables. Source: Authors’
computation using tax returns data and tax return law.
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Figure 12: Capital Share, 1968-2011
Notes: Proxies of capital income share of GDP. For the period 1991-2011 the series
report the capital factor share (gross operating surplus of households and firms).
For 1968-1982 the series report the net income the state extracted as the owner
from enterprises, i.e. profit and income tax. An alternative series includes the
net of production subsides and production tax, and is detailed in the Appendix.
Sources and definition of capital share for the United States are in Bengtsson and
Waldenström (2015).
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Figure 13: Capital to GDP ratios
Notes: Estimates of fixed capital to GDP, net of depreciation, based on two different
methodologies and on two different sources of data. For 1995-2010 assets are cal-
culated at market value. For 1959-1980 half of the assets such as dwellings, roads,
bridges, dams, private sector assets is valued at replacement value, while the other
half is valued at book value (1968 prices, and 1976 prices). Sources and measurement
methodologies are detailed in the Appendix.
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Figure 14: Top 1% labor share and the skill premium, 1920-2008.
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Figure 15: Skilled Labor Supply and Skill Premium, 1955-2011
Notes: Skilled labor supply is the percentage of the labor force with high school and
university degrees, and skill premium is the ratio of log average white-collar worker
wage over log average blue-collar worker wage. (See Appendix 7 for details.)
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